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ings, the welfare hearings of the Depart-
ment of Social Services, the Coastal
Commission, and numerous other agen-
cies not covered by the adjudication sec-
tions of the existing APA.
10. Of course, other legislation may
expand the coverage of OAH, make ALJ
decisions final, or transfer the adjudica-
tory power of agency heads to a separate
administrative court. For example, the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Board and the State Bar Court are au-
tonomous bodies that are separated from
the investigation and prosecution units of
the ABC or the State Bar. In addition, it
is possible that legislation will make
final the decisions of ALJs in cases in-
volving medical professionals. The new
APA will apply to whatever adjudicatory
format is prescribed by agency-specific
reform legislation.
11. Under Proposed Government Code
section 643.320, prosecutory and adjudi-
cative functions must be separated
within the agency. This is accomplished
by isolating the presiding officer and the
agency heads from receiving advice
from staff members who played ad-
versarial roles in the case.
12. The Attorney General opposes
this provision. See Appendix B of the
AG's letter cited in note 4, supra.
13. Currently, a few agencies have
emergency "interim suspension" author-
ity, including the State Bar, CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6007(c), the Medical
Board of California, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 11529, and other occupational licens-
ing agencies within the Department of
Consumer Affairs, CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 494.
14. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11507.6.
15. The Commission is suggesting
certain changes in APA discovery, such
as making discovery orders enforceable
at the agency level rather than requiring
trips to the superior court and introduc-
ing a system of continuing disclosure.
Proposed CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 645.210,
645.320.
16. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340 et seq.
17. See id. at §§ 11349(a), 11349.1(a)(1).
18. See Proposed CAL. GOv'T CODE
§§ 633.040, 633.050.
19. The AG also furnished a long list
of specific changes he would favor in the
Commission's draft if it decides to go
forward with its more comprehensive ap-
proach. A copy of the AG's letter may
be obtained from the Commission. See
supra note 2.
he staid world of public utility reg-
ulation is being blasted by the
winds of change. The forces of de-
regulation are gathering strength. It is
clear that the utility world of the future
will be regulated far more by market
forces than by state utility commissions. It
will no longer be possible to take six years
to fix a utility's rates when dynamic forces
change markets on a daily basis.
How should the California Public Util-
ities Commission (PUC) regulate when its
role is no longer to set cost-of-service
prices for regulated monopolies but to pro-
tect consumers, assure adequate supplies,
and help utilities adapt in a world of com-
petitive markets? In addition to its struggle
to cope with this frightening new world,
the PUC has been afflicted by problems
largely of its own making, such as the re-
cent IRD fiasco.
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To address these issues, an advisory
committee chaired bK former PUC Pres-
ident Donald Vial recently recom-
mended significant changes in Commis-
sion procedures. Appointed by the Sen-
ate Committee on Energy and Public
Utilities,4 the Vial Committee took a
fresh look at PUC management and pro-
cedure and recommended some funda-
mental changes. Among the many sug-
gestions in its report, perhaps the follow-
ing are the most important.
The Management Forum. The PUC
needs much stronger management. At
present, the perception is that nobody ac-
tually makes management decisions
about how to deal with pending matters
or how to scope the issues to be resolved
in pending cases.
The Vial Committee agreed that bet-
ter management could be achieved by a
"Case and Issues Management Forum"
to make early decisions about how to
handle cases. For example, what proce-
dural format is appropriate (rulemaking
or adjudication)? What issues should be
resolved, and which ones deferred? What
staff resources should be assigned to a
pending matter? The Forum should, ide-
ally, consist of the PUC President, the
assigned commissioner,5 and as many of
the other commissioners as possible, in
addition to key staff members.
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Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act
Revisions. In order to implement this
highly desirable management reform,
however, the Bagley-Keene Open Meet-
ing Act7 must be amended. All five com-
missioners should be encouraged to par-
ticipate in the Forum, but Bagley-Keene
prohibits meetings of more than two
commissioners without full compliance
with the open meeting law.
The PUC has been bedeviled by
Bagley-Keene on a number of occa-
sions. Experience in California and in
other states makes it clear that frank dis-
cussion of difficult problems does not
occur in open meetings. Commissioners
must be able to disagree, candidly and
vigorously, with one another in ways
they will never do when the public is
watching. Staff must be willing to cor-
rect commissioners, although they know
they must never make their bosses look
bad in public meetings.
Thus, we must choose between let-
ting the PUC deliberate in closed meet-
ings or allowing it to be run with no de-
liberation at all.9 As a result, the Vial
Committee unanimously favored a nar-
rowly-tailored Bagley-Keene Act excep-
tion to permit the PUC to conduct closed
meetings concerning preliminary and
procedural aspects of pending cases. The
Commission would never consider the
merits of the substantive issues at these
meetings-only the non-substantive but
vital management issues.
Greater Use of Rulemaking. The
PUC is enslaved by a trial mentality. It
makes policy largely through case-by-
case adjudication, often in the form of
ponderous cost-of-service ratemaking
cases conducted by its administrative
law judges (ALJs). The trials feature
endless cross-examination of a parade of
expert witnesses by counsel for all par-
ties (including many intervenors). The
Vial Committee believes that the new re-
alities of utility regulation no longer per-
mit the luxury of policymaking through
courtroom theatrics.






Thus, the Vial Committee favored
much greater use of rulemaking by the
PUC. 1 The trial culture of the agency
has inhibited it from trying to grapple
with policy issues through rulemaking,
but rulemaking is far better adapted for
policymaking than is adjudication. The
PUC must be able to establish the
ground rules for utility participation in
competitive markets, then get out of the
way. A majority of the Committee mem-
bers agreed that the legislature should es-
tablish a rebuttable presumption that pol-
icy should be made through rulemaking
rather than adjudication, but there was
disagreement on this point.
Although the PUC is largely exempt
from the statute which governs the
rulemaking process in other state agen-
cies,1I1 the Vial Committee believes that
the PUC should comply with some of the
requirements of that statute. Thus, the
Committee agreed that the public must
be adequately notified of proposed rules
and have adequate opportunity to com-
ment in writing and orally. The PUC
should be required to open its files so
that the public can examine its method-
ology. Also, the PUC should be required
to respond in the final rule to significant
criticisms or alternative suggestions of-
fered by the public. And the public
should be permitted to petition for adop-
tion of a new rule or for modification or
repeal of an existing one. The Commis-
sion also needs to explore intervenor
funding in rulemaking so that all inter-
ested parties can afford to take part in
the process.
There was also agreement that ex
parte contacts might be less stringently
regulated in rulemaking than in adjudi-
cation. 12 For example, ex parte contacts
in the rulemaking process might be un-
regulated up until the deadline for filing
the last round of comments; thereafter,
ex parte contacts would have to be dis-
closed and placed on the record.
In addition, the Committee generally
agreed that the PUC should experiment
with less formal rules, such as policy
statements, that can be adopted without
time-consuming public participation.
Policy statements inform both outside
parties and the staff of how the Commis-
sion intends to exercise a discretionary
power in the future. Policy statements
are tentative, not binding, but are very
helpful to anyone who must predict what
the PUC will do. Also, policy statements
are useful in that they guide the staff's
exercise of discretionary regulatory pow-
ers.
PUC Decisionmaking: Conference
Hearings. If the PUC must adjudicate-
and often it must, it should be clearly
empowered to conduct informal rather
than formal hearings in cases where de-
termination of credibility is not at issue.
In an informal or "conference" hearing,
the ALJ would have power to dispense
with cross-examination and other trial-
type procedures. Trial-type procedure is
appropriate and necessary when the issue
to be determined is truthtelling. But it is
very inefficient and costly both to mem-
bers of the public and to the Commission
itself when the PUC is seeking to deter-
mine questions of legislative fact, law,
or policy.
The concept of a conference hearing
has been adopted in numerous states and
in the Model State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act of 1981.13 In such hearings,
experts offer written testimony and all
parties may submit written and oral ar-
guments. Cross-examination is not em-
ployed. It is unclear whether the PUC is
authorized to conduct informal hearings
under its existing statute; the Vial Com-
mittee favors legislative action to clearly
empower to PUC to use this approach.
Separation of Functions. The Divi-
sion of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA) is
an independent entity within the PUC
charged with reviewing and analyzing
utility applications, participating in evi-
dentiary hearings, and making recom-
mendations in the best long-term inter-
ests of utility ratepayers. Because DRA
frequently participates as a party in ad-
judicative proceedings, present PUC
rules separate the staff members of DRA
from participation in decisionmaking.
The Commissioners are advised only by
members of the Commission Advisory
and Compliance Division (CACD), not
by DRA staff members. The Vial Com-
mittee rejected a proposal that DRA be
made even more independent by, for ex-
ample, removing it from the Commission
or allowing it to appeal PUC decisions
to the Supreme Court.
But the Committee did not reach con-
sensus on whether the existing system of
separation of functions might be relaxed.
For example, it might be possible to
allow DRA staff members who have not
worked on a particular case to advise the
Commission in non-prosecutory adjudi-
cative proceedings, as opposed to the
present rule that excludes all DRA staff
from all advice-giving. 14 It might also be
possible to provide for less separation of
functions in rulemaking than in adjudi-
cation, 15 or to permit DRA to participate
in closed meetings of the Case and Is-
sues Management Forum.16 Some mem-
bers favored allowing the director of
DRA to sit with the Forum since DRA
is a key part of the staff with great ex-
pertise and experience. Its participation
in making management decisions could
be very helpful. In addition, decisions
concerning allocation of PUC resources
affect DRA greatly. Other members of
the Vial Committee disagreed; they be-
lieve DRA should never have any more
access or opportunity for input than any
other party.
Alternative Dispute Resolution. The
PUC has made large strides in im-
plementing alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) procedures. 17 Even more can be
achieved by using the processes of ne-
gotiation, mediation, and arbitration to
settle disputes. ADR is an absolute ne-
cessity in the brave new world of utility
competition. Many times, parties work-
ing together can come up with a win-win
settlement that is far superior to what an
agency could achieve through adjudica-
tion. Even when an all-party settlement
cannot be achieved, the process of trying
to achieve one can be very constructive
and may furnish the PUC with the basis
for an adjudicated outcome.
In addition, the PUC needs to exper-
iment with negotiated rulemaking. Fed-
eral agencies report great success with
"reg-neg," and the federal APA now re-
quires all agencies to consider this op-
tion. Not all disputes, and not all pro-
posed rules, can be negotiated, but many
can.
The Vial Committee also took a look
at the PUC's practice of conducting
workshops on pending problems. Work-
shops are informal decision-facilitating
forums. They seem to work very well
and the Committee recommended that
the PUC adopt comprehensive workshop
guidelines.
CONCLUSION
If adopted, the Vial Committee's sug-
gestions would make fundamental
changes in the way PUC does business.
All utility professionals should be aware
of the Vial Committee report and furnish




1. Professor of Law, UCLA School
of Law.
2. The PUC's September 17, 1993
Implementation Rate Decision (IRD)
fundamentally restructured telephone
rates to accommodate competition in the
provision of toll call service. On the
night before the decision was released,
staff members from the telephone com-
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panies came to the PUC's offices and
helped to write portions of the decision.
When this conflict was disclosed, the
PUC felt compelled to rescind its deci-
sion. See Peter Arth, Jr., Lynn T. Carew,
Kenneth K. Henderson, Report to the
Commission: A Review of the Events
Surrounding D.93-09-076 (IRD) (Oct.
13, 1993); see also 14:1 CAL. REG. L.
REP. 166 (Winter 1994).
3. The author was a member of the
Vial Committee. Other members in-
cluded Vice-Chair Barbara Barkovich, a
San Francisco attorney; Lynn T. Carew,
Chief Administrative Law Judge of the
PUC; Robert C. Fellmeth, Price Profes-
sor of Public Interest Law at the Univer-
sity of San Diego School of Law and Di-
rector of the Center for Public Interest
Law; Wesley Franklin, Assistant Execu-
tive Director of the PUC; Arturo
Gandara, Professor of Law, UC Davis
School of Law; Frederick E. John, Pres-
ident of Southern California Gas Com-
pany; Martin Mattes, a San Francisco at-
torney; and G. Mitchell Wilk, former
President of the PUC. The Vial Commit-
tee was assisted by David M. Gamson,
Senior Consultant to the Senate Commit-
tee on Energy and Public Utilities. The
opinions expressed in this article are the
author's alone.
4. The chair of the Senate Committee
is Senator Herschel Rosenthal. Senator
Rosenthal appointed a Subcommittee on
PUC Reforms which includes himself,
Senator Newton Russell, and Senator Al-
fred Alquist.
5. In all formal proceedings, one of
the PUC commissioners is assigned to
guide the case through PUC processing.
An administrative law judge conducts
public hearings, advises the assigned
commissioner of major developments,
and prepares a recommended decision
for Commission vote. The assigned com-
missioner then places that case on the
agenda of the full Commission for final
decision. Sometimes the assigned com-
missioner prepares an alternative deci-
sion to compete with the ALJ proposal.
6. These include the PUC's Execu-
tive Director and its General Counsel.
For discussion of whether the director of
the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advo-
cates (DRA) should be allowed to sit
with the Forum, see infra text at note 16.
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11120 et seq.
8. See, e.g., letter from Floyd D.
Shimomura, Assistant Attorney General,
to PUC President Daniel W. Fessler
(Mar. 4, 1994), which is printed as an
appendix to Recommendations of the Ad-
visory Group to the Subcommittee, Infor-
mational Hearing of the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Public Utilities Commission
Reforms (Mar. 8, 1994) (hereinafter "In-
formational Hearing"). This letter alleges
that several closed meetings concerning
PUC organization violated the Bagley-
Keene Act. The PUC's practice of "seri-
atim meetings," see infra note 9, has also
been questioned as possibly violative of
Bagley-Keene.
9. If open meeting laws apply, the
general experience has been that they
will be circumvented. For example, there
will be "seriatim meetings" (President
speaks to Commissioner A, then to B, C,
and D). Or staff members representing
each commissioner will meet to make
decisions based on the views of their
bosses. The actual open meetings tend to
be carefully scripted performances in
which no serious deliberation takes
place. These are clearly suboptimal
decisionmaking modalities. See Ashley
C. Brown, Sunshine May Cloud Good
Decision Making, F. FOR APPLIED RE-
SEARCH & PUB. POL'Y (Summer 1992).
10. The PUC is fortunate to be al-
most wholly exempted from the onerous
rulemaking provisions of the California
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11340 et seq., in-
cluding the requirement of approval of
rules by the Office of Administrative
Law. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11351(a). See
Michael Asimow, California Under-
ground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L. REV.
43, 48-51 (1992), for a brief description
of the APA rulemaking procedure in Cal-
ifornia. Thus, the PUC is free to structure
its own rulemaking procedures in ways
that facilitate maximum public input
consistent with efficient decisionmaking.
II. See supra note 10.
12. The Committee favored more re-
strictive provisions relating to ex parte
contacts in adjudication than apply under
existing rules. At present, ex parte con-
tacts are permitted but must be disclosed.
The Committee suggests they be banned
after the deadline for filing reply com-
ments.
13. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 4-401, 15
U.L.A. 1 (1990) (hereinafter "Model
State APA").
14. The Model State APA, supra note
13, would permit such advice-giving. Id.
at § 4-214(a). The separation of func-
tions provision in the federal APA does
not apply at all to ratemaking or similar
types of adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. §
554(d)(B). See generally Michael As-
imow, When the Curtain Falls: Separa-
tion of Functions in the Federal Admin-
istrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
759 (1981).
15. The Committee did not reach
agreement on separation of functions in
rulemaking. It would seem, however,
that the customary rigid separation of
DRA members from giving advice to the
Commissioners might well be relaxed in
rulemaking proceedings.
16. Such participation would be per-
mitted by the Model State APA, supra
note 13, which permits a person who
participated in a preliminary determina-
tion to serve as a presiding officer or ad-
vise a presiding officer in the same pro-
ceeding. Id. at § 4-214(c).
17. See Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Hearing Before the Public Utilities
Commission (Oct. 12, 1993).
18. An informational hearing has al-
ready been held in which numerous in-
terested parties discussed the Vial
Committee's recommendations. See In-
formational Hearing, supra note 8. The
Vial Committee's final report has been
published as Report of Advisory Working
Group on CPUC Reforms to Senate Sub-
committee on Public Utilities Commis-
sion Reforms of Senate Committee on
Energy and Public Utilities (June 1,
1994).
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